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BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT PROTECTION ACT
DAVID BEIER*
ROBERT H. BENSON**

I.

SUMMARY

Current United States patent and trade laws are inadequate to protect the creative and scientific genius of American inventors who use
recombinant techniques to produce proteins that are useful as human
therapeutics.' The potential for unfair foreign competition, the need
for enhanced incentives to develop new biotechnology-derived pharmaceutical products, and basic notions of fairness and economic certainty
dictate that Congress should enact amendments to our patent law.
II.

INTRODUCTION

The promise of modem biotechnology can only be assured by
strong intellectual property protection. Patent protection for breakthrough inventions secures for inventors, and the financial sponsors of
the research, sufficient rewards to stimulate further innovation. During
the past Congress, 2 and again this Congress, 3 legislation was introduced
to improve the degree of patent protection offered to biotechnologyderived products and processes. This article outlines the case for such
legislation, describes the legislative process to date, and offers suggestions for further action.

III.

GENERAL BACKGROUND ON THE PROBLEM

Biotechnology is a singular contribution to the modem age. This
technology, in its recent incarnation, represents an opportunity to create
dramatic breakthroughs in pharmaceuticals, medical devices, veterinary
products and agricultural products. The promise offered by biotechnol* Vice President, Government Affairs, Genentech, Inc. B.A. 1970, Colgate University; J.D. 1973, Albany Law School, Union University.
** Senior Patent Attorney, Genentech, Inc. Ph.D. 1972, University of Florida; J.D.
1980, University of Houston Law Center. The views expressed in this article are those of
the authors and not necessarily those of Genentech, Inc.
1. Similar problems and possibilities exist for recombinant polypeptides which are
useful as animal drugs, in manufacturing and for other commercial purposes.
2. H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), see also 136 CONG. REc. E213-14 (daily
ed. Feb. 7, 1990)(statement ofRep. Boucher); S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG.
REc. S3107-08 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990)(statement of Sen. DeConcini); and H.R. 5664,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)(introduced by Rep. Boucher Sept. 18, 1990). For a more
complete discussion of this proposed legislation, see infra sections V.B. and V.C.
3. H.R. 5664 has been reintroduced as the Biotechnology Patent Protection Act of
1991, H.R. 1417, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), S. 654, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG.
REC. S3286 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991). See also 137 CONG. REC. E946 (daily ed. Mar. 14,
1991)(statement of Rep. Boucher); 137 CONG. REC. S3284-86 (daily ed. Mar. 13,
1991)(statement of Sen. DeConcini).
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ogy is virtually limitless. It has already produced significant improvements in human health care, 4 and will result in similar changes in
agriculture. These developments are threatened, however, by the existence of a set of patent law rules that thwart innovators' receipt of a full
and fair reward for their scientific contribution.
In an era of demonstrably increased competition, the United States
should act affirmatively to protect those industries that are on the technological frontier and that offer the greatest hope for competitive advantage. Biotechnology is just such an industry. Since the discovery of
DNA technology, the majority of breakthrough research has occurred in
the United States. 5 Moreover, American biotechnology companies appear to be ahead of their foreign competition in most respects-for the
moment.
Unfortunately, this American leadership may not persist over time
for two basic reasons. First, United States patent law appears to have
fallen behind industrial needs. Second, American companies may face
unfair foreign competition from imported products based on American
inventions.
One long term consequence of inadequate patent protection for
biotechnology-derived products is the likelihood that some promising
therapies will not be pursued. A second consequence of patent uncertainty is the proliferation of patent litigation in this area. 6 The high
costs of such litigation may seriously drain the research budgets of biotech companies. 7 Moreover, the absence of legal certainty for biotechnology has a dampening effect on venture capital investments.
IV.
A.

SPECIFIC DEFICIENCIES OF UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADE LAW

Product Patents and Naturally Occurring Proteins

Product patents are patents which cover a composition of matter.
8
As explained in United States v. Studiengeselischaft Kohle:
The essential difference between [process and product patents]
relates to scope. A product patent gives the patentee the right
to restrict the use and sale of the product regardless of how and
4. Examples of biotechnology-derived human health care products include insulin,
human growth hormone, erythropoietin (a protein which stimulates the production of red
blood cells) and tPA (a protein used to dissolve clots). See NAT'L ACADEMY OF ENG'G, ENGINEERING AND THE ADVANCEMENT

OF HUMAN WELFARE:

10 OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENTS

1964-1989, at 42-45 (Dec. 5, 1989), reprintedin The Process Patent Amendments of 1990: Hearrngs on H.R. 3957 and H.R. 5664 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the
Admnistration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 33, at 260
(Sept. 25, 1990) [hereinafter Hearings].
5. The United States leads in research, but Japan has a strong commercial base in
biotechnology. OFFICE OF INDUS., U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES at v (1990).
6. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, 5 NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE-SPECIAL REPORT 56-58 (1989).

7. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 403 (1984).

8. 670 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

1991]

BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT PROTECTION ACT

175

by whom it was manufactured. A process patentee's power extends only to those products made by the patented process. A
process patent thus "leaves the field open to ingenious men to
invent and to employ other processes."
A sale of a product made by a patented process does not
itself infringe the patent; it is the unauthorized use of the process that infringes the patent. 9
In the field of pharmaceuticals, the patented product is usually described in terms of the structure of an active ingredient of the drug substance. Product patents are generally considered to provide better
protection for drugs than process or use patents because the latter two
types usually can be circumvented more easily or with less visibility. Inventors of some recombinant versions of naturally occurring products
have found it difficult to obtain adequate patent protection because of
the mere existence of literature disclosing incomplete information about
the natural protein.' 0
When the scientific literature or other available information reveals
that the naturally occurring version of the protein has been purified to
some extent, even if it has not been definitively characterized, a patent
for the recombinant version may be denied for lack of novelty; in patent
law terms, the product has already been discovered. 1' This may occur
even when the amount of the natural product that has been isolated is
insufficient for any practical use and the method employed cannot provide practical quantities of the material.
A second hurdle inventors must overcome is that a patent may be
denied because the recombinant product is deemed unpatentably obvious despite its novelty. In many cases, although the protein has never
before been isolated in a substantially pure form or the product was not
well characterized prior to the recombinant synthesis, if its basic properties and some aspects of its structure are known, the Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) may assert that the use of recombinant
technology to make a pure form of such a product is obvious. Most lay
persons would be astonished to learn that scientific breakthroughs, including those leading to international scientific recognition, have been
denied patent protection because they were held to be obvious. Yet that
12
is the current state of affairs.
9. Id. at 1127-28 (citations omitted).
10. A natural protein is a protein encoded by DNA that occurs in nature. A recombinant protein is a protein encoded by DNA that has been produced by combining genetic
material from at least two different sources.
11. See generally Murashige, Section 102/103 Issues in Biotechnology Patent Prosecution, 16
A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 294, 303-04 (1988-89); Andrews, UnaddressedQuestion in the Amgen Case, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 9, 1991, § 1, at 30, col. 5.
12. A researcher's ability to obtain a patent for a purified version of a protein to block
the use of a process to make commercially viable quantities of a recombinant version of the
protein has been criticized. See Merges & Nelson, On the Comple Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLuM. L. REv. 839, 903-04 (1990). See also Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.
Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified on reconsideration, 678 F.
Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 707 F.
Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 724 F.
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The existing law, as it is being applied, has the effect of offering an
incentive to firms who lag behind in research and technology development to attempt to leapfrog the innovators by patenting, or otherwise
disclosing, an allegedly purified protein, thereby blocking the scientific
leaders' ability to obtain a patent. This occurs even though the innovative contribution of the leaders is essential to make the protein available
as a practical matter. This technique produces little, if any, public good
and thwarts beneficial developments in public health. 13
The mere existence of a previously discovered protein should not,
by itself, preclude the issuance of a patent for a recombinantly created
version of the same protein. The rationale under which a patent may be
granted for a product existing in nature is that in its natural form, such a
product was not available and useful to the public without further isolation and purification. By the same rationale, if a product is made available in virtually unlimited quantities and in a highly purified state by the
application of recombinant technology, the recombinant product should
be patentable if its natural counterpart was available for the intended
use only in impractical quantities or with undesirable impurities or contaminants. Therefore, Congress should enact an amendment to the patent law that creates an appropriate incentive to use recombinant
technology to produce proteins.
B.

Process Patents
1. Misapplication of In re Durden

The second major defect in the United States patent law is the erroneous and inconsistent application of In re Durden,14 a nonbiotech patent
case, to important biotechnology-derived processes. As recognized by a
Patent Office supervisor, the use of this case as a basis for rejecting process patent claims in biotechnology is on the rise. 15 This is so because
many examiners have been incorrectly applying Durden to
biotechnology. 16
Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., Nos. 89-1541, -1542, -1543, -1646, -1647 (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 11, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file 3925)(reserving for further analysis
by the district court the issue whether a patent on a purified protein should serve to block
a patent on a recombinant version of the same protein).
13. This is not to suggest that all, or even most, disclosures of isolated or purified
proteins are made with this motive; however, the potential for abuse exists.
14. 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
15. Wiseman, Biotechnology Patent Practice-APrimer, 16 A.I.P.L.A. Qj.. 394, 411 (198889). See generally Litman, Obvious Process Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. 103, 71J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 775 (1989); Wegner, Much Ado About Durden, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'y 785 (1989).

16. Durden involved a challenge to the denial of a patent for a process to make a novel
chemical. The process was similar to that of a previously issued patent; however, the Durden process utilized a novel, but related, starting material and produced a novel, but related, end product. It appeared predictable once the new starting material and new
product were disclosed, that the old process would work with the new starting material to
produce the new product. The court in Durden concluded, in the narrow, factual context of

that case, that a chemical process, otherwise obvious, is not patentable even if either or
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The Patent Office has cited Durden in denying patents to processes
for producing proteins which use as starting materials, DNA, vectors or
biological microorganisms made by recombinant DNA technology. This
denial of process claim protection is routine even if the starting materials are found by the Patent Office examiner to be novel and nonobvious
and, therefore, patentable in their own right.
The rote application of Durden in the biotechnology context involving the use of microorganisms as starting materials is in direct conflict
with In re Mancy. 17 In Mancy, the court held that a new microbe could
not be treated as prior art in determining the patentability of a method
of using the microbe to produce an antibiotic therefrom by an otherwise
standard process.1 8 In other words, novelty and nonobviousness of the
microbe imparted patentability to a method of using it. Mancy is a much
more appropriate case to the biotechnology industry than Durden. The
net result of the present Patent Office practice has been to delay severely
or to prevent the issuance of process patent protection to deserving
inventors.
Moreover, inventors hve been forced to suffer inconsistent results
regarding process patent Frotection. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) acknowledges that there
have been conflicting views on this issue both in the Patent Office Board
of Appeals and in the Federal Circuit Court's predecessor, the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.). 19 But, Durden
20
is indefensible especially when applied to biotechnology.
Without appropriate process claims in their patents, biotechnology
inventors cannot take advantage of the benefits of the Process Patent
Amendments Act of 1988,21 thereby nullifying this Act's advantages for
the biotechnology industry. Resolution of these conflicts should be accomplished by additional legislation that will enable inventors to benefit
from the provisions of the 1988 Act.
The law as currently expressed provides that to be considered
obvious:
the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art [must be] such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having2 ordinary skill in the art to which said
2
subject matter pertains.
both the specific starting material employed and the product obtained, are novel and
unobvious.
17. 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974); see also In re Kuehl, 475 F.2d 658 (C.C.P.A. 1973);
MacAdams, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 445 (PTO Bd. App. 1978); Glaister, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
255 (PTO Bd. App. 1975).
18. Mancy, 499 F.2d at 1289.
19. Durden, 763 F.2d at 1409.
20. See generally Litman, supra note 15; McAndrews, Removing the Burden of Durden
Through Legislation: H.R. 3957 and H.R. 5664, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 1188
(1990); Wegner, supra note 15; Wiseman, supra note 15.
21. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1563 (codified as amended in scattered sections of

35 U.S.C.).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988)(emphasis added).
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The Federal Circuit court and the C.C.P.A. have reiterated many
times that an applicant's disclosure in a patent application cannot be
treated as prior art in determining the obviousness of the claimed invention. 23 The court has also emphasized that the invention as a whole
must be considered in assessing obviousness. 24 Finally, the court has
cautioned that a patentability determination must be made as of the time
the invention was made, and not as part of a hindsight reconstruction of
25
the invention given the applicant's disclosure.
The denial of process claims in circumstances where either the
starting material in a process, the product of the process, or both, are
novel and nonobvious (and therefore patentable) is contrary to all of
these principles. The essential elements, without which the claimed process could not have been described, were unknown before their disclosure by the applicant. They are not prior art and cannot be treated as
such. The essential elements are incontrovertibly a part of the subject
matter as a whole; without their presence in the claim, the claim cannot
be properly described. Furthermore, at the time the invention was
made, the claimed process could not have been obvious; its essential
elements being known only to the inventor.
2.

The Effect of In re Pleuddemann on the Need for Legislation

In re Pleuddemann26 is a recent case that may have a significant impact on biotechnology patent litigation. Both Pleuddemann and Durden
deal with process (method) patent claims involving a novel composition.
The Durden decision illustrated that a claimed process of making a novel
composition is not automatically patentable but must be analyzed on a
case-by-case basis in light of the prior art. 27 Pleuddemann dealt with the
process of using a novel compound. The Patent Office examiner had
rejected Pleuddemann's claims for using patented organosilanes as
bonding or priming agents to bond to a mineral filler or to prime a surface to improve bonding to organic resins. Pleuddemann's compound
was incorporated into the products made. The Patent Office examiner
and the Patent Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences used a
Durden argument to reject Pleuddemann's process-of-using claims, asserting that such a method was obvious based upon the prior art. 28
That is, it was obvious to use the Pleuddemann compound for bonding
or priming because other analogous compounds had been similarly
used.
The Federal Circuit court reversed the Patent Office's rejection saying that Durden did not apply, in part because Pleuddemann's process
23. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1567-88 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987); In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450 (C.G.P.A. 1982).
24. See John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1964), aft'd, 383 U.S. I
(1966).
25. In re Kuehl, 475 F.2d 658, 663-65 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
26. 910 F.2d 823 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
27. In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
28. Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d at 825.
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was a process-of-using, not a process-of-making.2 9 The court repeated
aspects of the Durden decision, emphasizing that obviousness under the
patent laws must be decided on the basis of each fact situation and that
there is no generally applicable rule.30 "It is the properties of [Pleuddemann's] compounds as bonding/priming agents for certain polymers
. .that give them their utility. As stated above, the compounds and
their use are but different aspects of, or ways of looking at, the same
invention .... 31
Pleuddemann does not reverse the Durden analysis rejecting processof-making claims; therefore, Durden presently stands as good law applicable to any process-of-making claims, despite the presence of a novel
starting material or novel product. Indeed, the Federal Circuit court
explicitly distinguished the Durden process-of-making rejection from the
32
Pleuddemann process-of-using rejection.
*

The Patent Office and the courts continue to apply Durden and reject claims involving methods of using novel DNA sequences and other
recombinant intermediates to make protein products. The classic Durden rejection maintains that a process of making a protein using a novel
DNA sequence is obvious, because others have previously used the same
process with other DNA sequences to make other proteins. It might be
asserted that recombinant DNA patent applications no longer need fear
such a Durden rejection of process-of-making claims which are based
upon a novel DNA sequence encoding a desired protein X. Unfortunately, the situation is not clear.
A prudent attorney certainly would seek to use Pleuddemann to the
client's advantage by rephrasing "a recombinant DNA process of making
protein X" into a Pleuddemann-style process-of-using claim, such as,
"contacting DNA with cellular enzymes or with a transcription/translation apparatus." This approach was successful in U.S. Patent 5,004,690,
issued April 2, 1991. However, it is not clear that such a semantic
change would always be successful. For example, the Patent Office examiner could assert that such a claim was really a process-of-making
claim in disguise. Such arguments would not apply to the situation in
Pleuddemann, where the method-of-using was totally unrelated to any
method-of-making. Thus, the examiner might claim that Pleuddemann
does not apply to methods of using DNA sequences and other recombinant intermediates, which would still be governed by the newly reaffirmed Durden analysis.
Additionally, if Pleuddemann-style using recombinant DNA claims
were allowed, the question of enforcement against those practicing the
claimed method outside the United States would remain. If the claim
only covered using the recombinant DNA in an expression vector (which
is not imported) then there would be little enforcement advantage over
29. Id. at 826-27.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 827.
32. Id.
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the claim to the recombinant DNA itself. The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) and the Federal Circuit court found
such claims unenforceable against imports in a recent decision regarding erythropoietin.3 3 Claims to using the recombinant DNA in a method
of protein synthesis could, however, be enforced against those who
would practice the synthetic method outside the United States and import the protein product.
Alternatively, some have argued that given the right case on appeal,
the Federal Circuit court might, at some future date, reverse Durden by
applying a Pleuddemann-type analysis finding that making is also not obvious because the Durden-type rejection presumes the new starting material or novel product to be prior art. While this possibility is consistent
with the analysis in Pleuddemann, there clearly is no certainty that such a
future decision will ever occur.
34
Some had hoped the November 9, 1990 rehearing of In re Dillon
would provide guidance regarding Durden and perhaps overrule it. In
very clear dicta, the Federal Circuit court summarized its attitude regarding Durden as follows:
Suffice it to say that we do not regard Durden as authority to
reject as obvious every method claim reading on an old type of
process, such as mixing, reacting, reducing, etc. The materials
used in a claimed process as well as the result obtained therefrom, must be considered along with the specific nature of the
process, and the fact that new or old, obvious or nonobvious,
materials are used or result from the process are only factors to
be considered, rather than conclusive indicators of the obviousness or nonobviousness of a claimed process. When any
applicant properly presents and argues suitable method claims,
they should be examined in light of all these relevant factors,
35
free from any presumed controlling effect of Durden.
Therefore, Durden is very much alive, but weakened and unpredictable in
its application by the individual patent examiner.
Durden-type rejections remain an even greater problem following
Pleuddemann because the Federal Circuit court explicitly avoided questioning Durden as good law, and distinguished making and using as two
different types of process claims. 36 A patent applicant may ask what new
route to protect a recombinant DNA process claim is available after
Pleuddemann? The answer is not clear because Pleuddemann does not ad33. Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, Inv. No. 337-TA-281, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906 (ITC Apr. 10, 1989), vacated and remanded sub nom. Amgen, Inc. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at the ITC had determined that Amgen's patent
did not "cover" a foreign company's process for producing a certain recombinant product,
and thus there was no trade law violation. The ITC adopted the ALJ's analysis of the
patent issue, but dismissed Amgen's complaint for lack of subject matterjurisdiction. The
Federal Circuit court found that the ITC had subject matter jurisdiction and vacated and
remanded.
34. 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
35. Id. at 695 (emphasis in original).
36. Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d at 827.
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dress that question. One could rephrase making claims as using claims
and then wait years to see whether the Patent Office and the courts will
accept this semantic manipulation as a means of avoiding a Durden-style
obviousness rejection. Certainly, however, congressional passage of
clear statutory language that explicitly removes the Durden-style rejec-

tion is a more direct and unambiguous route to protect recombinant
DNA method-of-making protein claims.
C.

Unfair Imports

The third and final deficiency in our law is best seen by examining
the glaringly unfair practice of permitting a foreign manufacturer to use
host cells, DNA isolates or vectors to produce a product and to ship it
into the United States without legal recourse for the holder of the patent
on the host cell. This practice has been endorsed by the ITC on the
37
basis of a crabbed reading of the trade law's Tariff Act provisions.
The importance of process claim protection is illustrated by Amgen,
Inc.'s inability to prevent importation of erythropoietin (EPO) into the
United States fromJapan by Chugai Pharmaceutical Company. Amgen's
patent did not contain a claim to a process of making EPO using patented host cells. The ITC refused to interpret the claims to the host
cells alone as constituting a process claim under existing law. Consequently, Amgen was denied relief based upon its patented host cells
since the ITC held that such claims to "host cells" per se were not process of making claims. When amendments to the Tariff Act were
adopted in 1988,38 Senator Lautenberg, a sponsor of the bill, observed:
The continued broad jurisdiction of the International Trade
Commission will help U.S. industry address the unfair activity
of foreign competitors who, for example, import products manufactured using patented genetic engineering technology.
Merely moving manufacture offshore does not absolve the
wrongdoer from the requirement to compete fairly. This
Trade Act protection prohibits the foreign enterprise from taking jobs from American workers by doing offshore that which
they could not lawfully do in the United States. 39
If at the end of a long and uncertain period of discovery of innovated
drug products and development of patented technology, a United States
innovator must watch helplessly as infringing foreign imitators reap the
harvest to which the innovator is entitled, there will be a substantial diminution or elimination of the economic incentives intended to encourage
those efforts.
The most controversial and public patent dispute in biotechnology40 involves the innovative product, recombinant erythropoietin
37. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906.
38. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
39. 134 CONG. REc. 20,086 (1988).
40. See, e.g., Andrews, Mad Scientists, Bus. MONTH, May 1, 1990, at 54.
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(rEPO), as litigated in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. 4 1 In this
case, Amgen conducted ground-breaking scientific research enabling it
to produce commercially viable commodities of rEPO. 4 2 This major scientific and medical advance did not, however, give Amgen sufficient patent rights to prevent importation of competing products from Japan
even though Amgen's competitors could not produce rEPO within the
United States without infringing Amgen's patents. The fundamental unfairness of this situation served, in part, to motivate congressional inter43
est in the problem of patent protection for biotechnology.
Genetics Institute, Amgen's competitor, held the legal rights to a
product patent on nonrecombinant EPO. 4 4 This patent, standing alone,
would not have permitted Genetics Institute to create enough EPO to
introduce a new pharmaceutical product to the market. To reach a viable product stage it was necessary to have the ability to determine the
DNA sequence of the protein, to locate a host cell to produce the protein, and to develop a method for producing the end product. Amgen
made all of these scientific contributions.
When Amgen attempted to enforce what it thought were its superior rights, it was denied relief in two separate forums. Both the ITC
and the Federal Circuit court denied Amgen's attempt to bar the importation of rEPO. 4 5 The denial was based on the ground that the jurisdictional statute for enforcement actions, section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930,46 required that the petitioner hold a valid United States process
patent. The court declined to decide whether, on the basis of a different
record, a more expansive reading of the statute was possible which
would thereby extend the scope of the host cell patent to products pro47
duced by the host cell.
41. 706 F. Supp. 94 (D. Mass. 1989)(Young, J., granting partial summary judgment
for Chugai and Genetics Institute).
42. Amgen is currently alone on the market with its version of EPO, EPOGEN, because the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 527, 21 U.S.C. 360cc
(1988). Under this Act, the sponsor of a new drug or biologic can, if certain market criteria are met, obtain market exclusivity for a period of seven years. In this case, Amgen
obtained market exclusivity because it established that rEPO was a safe and effective therapy for treatment of chronic renal failure, the relevant patient population of which is less
than 200,000.
43. See supra notes 2 & 3.
44. After this article was already set for publication, the Federal Circuit court handed
down an opinion which, in essence, upheld Amgen's patent claims with respect to its host
cell patent and invalidated Genetics Institute's patent with respect to the product, EPO.
See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Nos. 90-1273, -1275 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 5,
1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file 3481; WESTLAW, CTAF database 27262),
aff'g in part, rev'g in part, vacatingin part 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (D. Mass. 1989) (The
district court had upheld the validity of both parties' patents and had found mutual
infringement.).
45. Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, USITC Pub. 2186, Inv. No. 337-TA-281, 10
U.S.P.O.2d (BNA) 1906 (ITC Apr. 10, 1989), vacated and remanded sub noma.Amgen, Inc. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
46. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
47. This argument was explicitly raised for the first time in an amicus brief by
Genentech, Inc. The Federal Circuit court, however, declined permission to file this brief,
apparently because other parties objected that new untimely raised arguments would prejudice their position.
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Genetics Institute has filed a motion for a rehearing en banc of the
Federal Circuit's recent ruling that Amgen's product patent on the host
cell for making EPO was valid and infringed, while Genetics Institute's
product patent on purified EPO was invalid. The result of this case,
even if upheld, would not alter the lack of remedies to permit Amgen to
enforce its valid host cell patent in a manner to prevent importation of
the end product, EPO.
V.

A.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

General Background

Legislation should be proposed in Congress to provide that a person who has undertaken the research and supplied the inventive skills to
meet the underlying purposes of the patent law can be granted a patent.
A person who has the genius to make a significant technical advance
deserves to enjoy the maximal benefits of the incentives offered by the
patent laws.
The American patent law is largely a product of the fertile mind of
Thomas Jefferson who said, "ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement."'4 8 To enable Jefferson's vision, the Founders included specific authority in the Constitution for Congress to enact patent laws "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
49
Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries."
The Constitution vests Congress with the right to create incentives
for inventors to undergo the often enormous cost of developing new
products. 50 As the Supreme Court has construed the patent clause, the
"public interest" must be preserved by the patent laws Congress enacts. 5 1 One of the primary public purposes served by the patent laws is,
to paraphrase patent owner Abraham Lincoln, to add fuel to the fire of
genius in the discovery of new and useful things. 5 2 The proposed bill5"
meets this challenge by recognizing two important facts. First, unlike
some other industries (including some in high-technology areas), the
biotechnology industry is very dependent on patent protection. The economics of the pharmaceutical industry demonstrate the essential nature of patent protection to secure adequate rewards for the significant
research and development costs involved in creating a new drug. Second, biotechnology poses unique, even ingenious, patent law problems
as outlined above.
48. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980) (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (Washington ed. 1871)).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
50. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
51. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1942).
52. A. LINCOLN, Discoveries, Inventions and Improvements, in 5 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 99-113 (J. Nicolay &J. Hay eds. 1984).
53. See infra section V.B.
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B. A Proposed Remedial Bill: Section-By-Section Analysis
In the following discussion, this article outlines a proposed remedial bill to address the patenting problems faced by the biotechnology
industry. This proposed remedial bill consists of two sections. The language of proposed Section 2 has been previously introduced in the
54
United States House of Representatives and in the Senate.
1. Proposed Section 1
Proposed Section 1 would add the following new paragraph at the
5
end of 35 U.S.C. § 112: 5
A recombinant biological process to make a product may
be expressed as a claim to such recombinant product when prepared by a specified recombinant biological process, and such
claim shall be limited to such recombinant biological process
for determination of patentability under section 102 and section 103 and infringement under section 271 of this title.
This additional language provides that the mere existence of a purified
naturally occurring protein in the literature or in a previous patent does
not per se act to block the issuance of a patent on a product produced by
56
recombinant methods.
Under current law, Patent Office examiners reject, on the grounds
of obviousness or anticipation, claims to a recombinantly produced
polypeptide if it has been previously disclosed.5 7 Thus, current policy
has the direct result of providing an incentive merely to purify naturally
occurring proteins; it does not offer an incentive to create a practical
method to produce such proteins in useful quantities. In addition, this
view tends to favor the creation of new proteins that differ only slightly
from the naturally occurring protein solely to secure patent protection.
Some may argue that virtually all of the useful naturally occurring
proteins have already been found and characterized. This claim seems
astonishing in light of the existence of more than 50,000 such proteins.
Very few of these proteins have been produced in quantities that permit
evaluation of their utility in human therapies. Under the current law,
however, scientists and research-based companies have little incentive to
use sophisticated recombinant techniques to produce a protein once it
has been purified and the results have been published or patented.
The traditional pharmaceutical industry may be critical of proposed
Section 1 and express concern about the apparent deviation it makes
54. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.

55. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
56. This proposed section does not alter the existing patent law doctrine that permits
the patenting of purzfied proteins. See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F.
95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (L. Hand, J., upholding a patent
for purified adrenalin).
57. Proposed Section 1 establishes a more liberal standard of patentability for product-by-process claims in the area of recombinant technology. See, e.g., In re Fitzgerald, 619
F.2d 67, 70 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In reThorpe,
777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

1991]

BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT PROTECTION ACT

185

from settled patent law doctrines. 58 Such an argument fails to recognize
that the courts and Congress have previously modified product patent
law to benefit the traditional, small-molecule pharmaceutical industry. 59
This proposal heeds the Supreme Court's cautionary note by not
recapturing any invention already in the public domain 60 and by balancing disclosure with reward. 6 1 Under this proposal, the person who has a
pre-existing patent on a purified product or on a nonrecombinant
method of making the product continues to have dominant rights. The
proposed legislation expands the storehouse of knowledge by providing
an appropriate incentive to create these naturally occurring proteins in a
more pure form, for less cost, in larger quantities, and by more sophisticated technology.
The proposed bill appropriately moves from a single focus on protein structure to a combined focus on protein structure, practicality of
use or function, and cost. The reduction in cost of producing a protein
may be the only method by which the protein can be delivered in sufficient quantity to a patient population. Thus, in a sense, permitting the
Patent Office to grant patents on such products by a recombinant process is, in reality, merely a reward for a new use.
It should be noted that nothing in this proposal eliminates the general existing patent law requirements that a new product-by-process
claim must itself be nonobvious. Thus, if a previously granted patent or
publication would have led an ordinary person skilled in the art to use
recombinant technology, and that previous disclosure had provided sufficient information to make the use of recombinant technology obvious,
58. For example, the traditional "phenomena of nature" rules enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130-31
(1948).
59. These doctrinal changes in the law de-emphasize a focus on mere structure in
determining patentability of small molecules. The doctrine that permits patents to be issued even if there is close structural similarity to prior art if the compound exhibits surprisingly good effectiveness for a therapeutic application is an example of this shift in
focus. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1972);
In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier
Corp., 545 F. Supp. 486 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aft'd, 685 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1172 (1983). Secondly, section 100(b) of the 1952 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(b)(1988), explicitly permits process claims for new uses of old compounds. Finally,
the Supreme Court in Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980),
permitted product-like protection over nonstaple products sold by a patentee in conjunction with a patented "method of use." In each of these instances the law was altered to
meet new economic necessities.
60. See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
This proposed bill also meets the four-part test for new intellectual property legislation
suggested by former Representative Robert Kastenmeier. See Kastenmeier & Remington,
The Semiconductor Chip ProtectionAct of 1984: A Swamp on Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REv. 417,

440-41 (1985) (outlining harmony, clear definition, honest analysis of costs and benefits,
and enhancement of aggregate public domain as test factors).
61. Important distinctions between patent law and trade secrets involve length of
term and disclosure. The failure of current patent law to offer sufficient proprietary protection to biotechnology creates a greater temptation to rely on trade secrets. In turn,
greater reliance on trade secret protection in this field has high costs in terms of a reduced
pace of scientific advance, duplicative research and, perhaps, increased transaction costs.
See H.R. REP. No. 888, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 53-54 (1988).
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then a patent would not lie. For example, if a scientist has previously
purified a protein-like growth factor and has discovered both its genetic
sequence and potential uses, and routine recombinant steps would produce the protein, then a Patent Office examiner could reasonably conclude that the use of recombinant technology was obvious. The
underlying purpose to this proposed section is to permit assessment of
patentability on a case-by-case basis rather than to sanction the continued denial of such claims solely on the ground that a protein has been
disclosed previously, albeit in a form or quantity making its practical
utilization unlikely.
Finally, this proposal does not eliminate the requirement to examine the claims under the established enablement standards. 6 2 Thus,
the breadth and scope of such claims will still be determined based on
the amount and sufficiency of disclosure, the amount of prior art, and
the predictability and level of skill in the art. 63 Nor does this proposal at
all prevent patentability of improved methods of recombinantly preparing the product. Even if a broad claim is warranted under the examination standards of section 112, others can still obtain patent protection
for improved processes. The obtained claim to a broad product-by-process would then be dominant or superior to the subsequent claim.
2.

Proposed Section 2

Section 2 of the proposed legislation would amend 35 U.S.C.
§ 10364 by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
A process of making a product shall not be considered obvious under this section if an essential material used in the process is novel under section 102 and otherwise nonobvious
under section 103.65
This addition legislatively overrules Durden and codifies the holding of
Mancy.
There is general agreement in the biotechnology patent bar that
Durden should not apply to biotechnology, yet some may assert that this
legislative solution to the so-called Durden problem is unnecessary and
that the ordinary appeal process should be sufficient. While this argument has superficial appeal, it ignores the real-world transactional costs
of such an approach. For companies wishing to obtain rapid FDA approval and marketing of a new drug, the luxury of pursuing a process
62. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). The enablement standards in the first paragraph of section 112 provide:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
63. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
546 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f 1986).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
65. S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1, 136 CONG. REC. S3108 (daily ed. Mar. 22,
1990); H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1990).
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claim through a multiyear appeals process may not be available. 66 Second, this argument misses the point that all such appeals would be decided on a case-by-case basis. Thus, there is no certainty that a "test"
case would solve the problem on anything other than an individual
basis.
The best argument in favor of legislation addressing the Durden
problem is the total absence of such a limitation in Western Europe or
Japan. 67 Both of these legal systems have a strong tradition of protecting process patents. Removal of the Durden limitation will fully avail the
United States biotech industry of the benefits afforded by the Process
Patent Amendments Act of 1988.68
When the availability of process claims is limited or delayed by Durden problems, that 1988 Act is as much as non-existent, especially to
innovators in the biotechnology industry. The present proposal therefore corrects an unintended effect of the Patent Office's policy: denying
a promising nascent United States industry the advantages of legislation
intended for its benefit.
Proposed Section 2 provides certainty and protects the rights not
only of biotechnology innovators but of innovators in other United
States industries as well. While Durden's effects are perhaps most visible
in the biotechnology field, they lead to irrational decisions as to obviousness in all fields.
The proposed text of Section 2 of the bill addresses virtually all of
the problems that are likely to occur with respect to the protection of
biotechnology-derived products. If, as proposed here, the innovator is
able to obtain a valid process patent free from the impediments and delays arising as a result of Durden, there is little need for a remedy specific
to the products of patented host cells. This is so because under current
law69 the holder of a process patent can obtain adequate remedies at the
border through the use of the International Trade Commission, or do70
mestically under United States patent law.
In the earlier versions of the legislation, a specific remedy was proposed for making, using, or selling the product of a patented "essential
biological material" (i.e., a host cell or other similar essential biological
intermediate).7 1 While this proposal would have served to meet the
66. For example, Amgen, Inc. deferred pursuit of its process claims on EPO when a
Durden objection was raised by the Patent Office.
67. S. BENT, R. SCHWAAB, D. CONLIN & D.JEFFERY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY WORLDWIDE 504-05 (1987).

68. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
69. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107. This policy orientation was also a motivating function when Congress overruled
Deep South Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) as part of the Patent Law
Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383.
70. 35 U.S.C. § 2 71(g) (1988).
71. H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1990) and companion bill S. 2326, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. § 2, 136 CONG. REC. S3108 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) are identical except
the Senate bill uses the term "an essential biotechnological material" where the House bill
uses the term "a biotechnological material."
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specific needs of the biotechnology industry, it proved to be broader
than generally necessary and extremely controversial. 7 2 As a result of
that controversy and of a recognition by proponents of the legislation
that the vast majority of the problems addressed by this legislation could
be resolved without resort to an industry-specific provision, this section
7
of the bill was deleted. 3
This is not to say that there will not be a narrow range of circumstances in which an innovator will be unable to obtain complete protection from unfair offshore competition. This narrow problem could
occur with respect to innovators who have been denied process patent
protection because of Durden and who cannot take advantage of the proposed legislation because they can seek reissuance under United States
74
law.
There could also be parties who could lose the benefits of this remedial legislation if they are, or were, unable to obtain a process patent
in a timely fashion because of non-Durden problems-such as questions
arising from issues of "first to invent." This may be the case temporarily
for Amgen which is currently in an interference in the Patent Office concerning the validity of its claim for priority for a method of making EPO.
Amgen's claim to a process patent appears to be strong in light of the
factfinding by the district and Federal Circuit courts. If, as a result,
Amgen obtains a process patent, there is no need for a "host cell" remedy. Such a process patent, if acquired, would provide Amgen with all
the rights necessary to obtain a remedy that would prevent the importation of EPO.
3.

Legislation

When the original Biotechnology Patent Protection Act was introduced in early 1990, 7 5 it generated substantial support from the industry7 6 and academia. 7 7 Over time, however, the legislation provided a
72. Unfortunately, earlier proposals to address these situations proved to be controversial. The Bush Administration in particular objected to providing a specific fix for the
biotechnology industry. It also feared that to tread on amendments to section 337 of the
Tariff Act could complicate the already delicate international trade talks in the General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade. See letter from Wendell L. Willkie, II, General Counsel of
the U.S. Dep't of Commerce to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary (July 5, 1990) [hereinafter Willkie Letter], reprintedin Hearings,supra note 4, at
108-13.
73. Compare H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) with H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990). See also Hearings, supra note 4, at 17-33 (statement of Harry F. Manbeck, Jr.).
74. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988) (relating to reissuance).
75. The Biotechnology Patent Protection Act of 1990 (H.R. 3957 and its companion
bill S. 2326) was introduced in the House of Representatives in February, see 136 CONG.
REC. E213-14 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) and in the Senate in March, see 136 CONG. REC.
S3107-08 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990).
76. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 115-28 (statement of the Industrial Biotechnology
Association) and at 118 (table indicating that of I1 top biotech companies, 9 support the
legislation, I has no position, and only I opposes it).
77. See, e.g., letter from Katharine Ku, Pres. Ass'n of Univ. Technology Managers to
Rep. Rick Boucher (Dec. 15, 1989), reprintedin Hearings, supra note 4, at 129-30; letter from
Sheldon E. Steinbach, Vice Pres. & Gen. Counsel, Am. Council on Educ. to Rep. Robert
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degree of controversy, especially regarding the effective date. 78 Opponents, such as Genetics Institute, argued that the bill would have affected the outcome of a pending case involving EPO. 79 This
controversy effectively derailed the detailed consideration of the original
bill.
After the bill was introduced, the relevant congressional committees asked the Bush Administration for its views of the pending measures. In a July 1990 letter, the Department of Commerce, speaking for
the Administration, offered its views. 80 The letter reasoned that special
remedies for products of patented host cells were unnecessary because
sufficient remedies were available if the inventor secured a process patent. The Department of Commerce argued that if Durden was the only
impediment to obtaining process patents, then the solution lay with
amendments that addressed only that issue. In addition, the Administration expressed strong opposition to the effective date provisions of
the original bill.

As a result of the objections of the Administration and others, a
second bill, the Process Patent Amendments of 1990,81 was introduced
in September of 1990 by Representative Boucher. This bill was largely
crafted in response to the recommendations of the Administration.
C. CongressionalHearings
A congressional hearing on H.R. 3957 and H.R. 5664 was held in
September of 1990.82 The witnesses at this hearing were far from uniform in their views. The Administration testified in favor of H.R. 5664,
but against H.R. 3957. Representatives of biotechnology firms were
similarly divided. Genetics Institute and Upjohn, parties to the dispute
about EPO, testified against H.R. 3957. Amgen's Chairman and CEO
testified in favor of H.R. 3957. The witness representing Genentech,
one of the authors of this article, testified in favor of legislation to address this problem generally. Finally, a witness representing some large
W. Kastenmeier (April 4, 1990), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 4, at 150-51; letter from
KarlJ. Hittelman, Ph.D., Assoc. Vice Chancellor Academic Affairs, Univ. of Cal., San Francisco to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (June 27, 1990), reprintedin Hearings,supra note 4, at
201; letter from Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Tennessee,
Knoxville to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (July 17, 1990), reprintedin Hearings,supra note 4,
at 206-09; letter from Thomas J. Bennett, Director, Research Services, Loyola Univ., Chicago to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (Aug. 3, 1990), reprintedin Hearings, supra note 4, at
211; letter of Richard L. Wallace, Vice Pres. for Academic Affairs, Univ. of Missouri to
Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier (Aug. 20, 1990), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 4, at 212.
One of the underlying reasons for the support of the university community is that
universities appear to suffer disproportionately from Durden rejections. See Hearings, supra
note 4, at 122 (statement of the Industrial Biotechnology Ass'n discussing forfeiture of
process patent protection by deserving universities).
78. See Andrews, Disputed Provision in Gene Bill, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1990, § 1, at 36,
col. 5. See also Hearings, supra note 4, at 33-38 (testimony of Bruce M. Eisen, Vice President-Chief Patent Counsel, Genetics Institute, Cambridge, Mass.).
79. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94 (D. Mass. 1989).
80. Willkie Letter, supra note 72.
81. H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See supra note 3.
82. Hearings, supra note 4.
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industrial companies testified in favor of letting these issues be resolved
by further judicial developments.
The hearing clearly established the fault lines for further consideration in the next Congress. Some parties will continue to push for congressional resolution of a judicially created problem, while others will
continue to insist on awaiting further judicial action. The second major
issue of division concerns the competing equities of Congress involving
itself in an ongoing commercial dispute. Unfortunately, this latter issue
has come to dominate the discussion. Fair and complete resolution of
the problems associated with the effective date of this legislation will be
difficult to achieve without further compromise by the parties and by
further judicial decisions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

International competition, industrial competitiveness, and fundamental fairness demand the enactment of new laws to enhance the incentives for biotechnology-derived products. This initiative will work to
benefit high risk, high cost, innovative scientific research and will stimulate investment in new technologies leading to dramatic advances in biotherapeutics beneficial to public health.

